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Religion in the Public Sphere: Challenges and 
Opportunities 
Blandine Chelini-Pont∗
Since I have been given the honor of opening this session, let me 
thank the organizers for allowing me to offer a rather general 
reflection on the place of religion in the public sphere in both 
Europe and the United States. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in 1989, female Muslim students in France were 
disciplined in schools for refusing to remove their headscarves.1 At 
the request of the French Education Ministry, France’s Conseil 
d’Etat (State Council) affirmed the right of religious expression 
inside the public schools.2 The Conseil ruled forty-one times (on 
forty-nine cases) between 1991 and 1999 against schools who 
disciplined Muslim girls for wearing headscarves.3 Despite these 
∗ Equipe Droit et Religion du Laboratoire Droit et Mutations Sociales (Jeune Equipe 
2425), Responsable du Master Laïcité et Droit des cultes, Universite Paul Cézanne, Aix-en-
Provence, France. 
 1. Voile à l’école: les principales dates [Veils in School: The Principle Dates], AP FRENCH 
WORLDSTREAM, Dec. 17, 2003. The article details the major foulard cases from 1989 to the 
present. 
 2. Conseil d’Etat, avis no. 346,893, Nov. 27, 1989, available at http://www.conseil-
etat.fr/ce/missio/index_mi_cg03_01.shtml. 
The result of constitutional and legislative texts and of the [above mentioned] 
international engagements of France is that the principle of laïcité in public 
teaching, which is one of the elements of State laïcité and the neutrality of 
public services, establishes that teaching be done with respect, on the one hand, 
for this neutrality by programs and teachers and, on the other hand, for the 
freedom of conscience of pupils. In accordance with principles recalled by these 
same texts and international engagements, it prohibits any discrimination in the 
access to teaching which would be founded on the religious convictions or 
beliefs of students. This recognized freedom for students thus includes for them 
the right to express and manifest their religious beliefs within academic 
establishments, in respect to pluralism and the freedom of others, without 
undermining the activities of teaching, with the contents of programs and the 
obligation of assiduity. 
Id. (translated by Holly Hinckley Lesan and Richard Call). 
 3. L’Islam dans la République [Islam in the Republic], rapport 2000 du Haut Conseil à 
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rulings, the disputes continued and became extremely contentious 
during 2003 when the issue received national attention and incited 
public protests, as well as legislative and executive debate. In March 
2004, with broad public support but amid public protests by 
members of the Muslim community and others, the Assemblée 
Nationale passed a law banning students from wearing conspicuous 
religious clothing in public schools.4 Although the law also forbids 
Jewish yarmulkes and Christian crosses, the refusal of Muslim girls to 
remove their headscarves in school was undoubtedly the catalyst for 
the law, and debate in the legislature focused almost exclusively on 
the headscarf cases. 
The dispute revolved around a fundamental ideal of the French 
republic: laïcité. Although the concept of laïcité defies a precise 
definition,5 it embodies the constitutional principle of the State’s 
neutrality.6 As President Jacques Chirac stated, laïcité “is at the heart 
of (the French) republican identity.”7 Laïcité strictly calls for a state 
that is free from an official or exclusive religion; however, this 
freedom is commonly understood in France as an absence of 
religious expression in the public sphere. The constitutional principle 
of laïcité, which permits state neutrality (comparable to the American 
separation of church and state), differs greatly from its perceived 
meaning among citizens and the government officials who use the 
l’Intégration, available at http://www.islamlaicite.org/IMG/pd/isl_repu_ht_conseil.pdf (last 
visited May 9, 2005). 
 4. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République Française 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190; JCP G 2004, No. 13, Actu. 168, 
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo= 
MENX0400001L (last visited May 9, 2005) and http://www.religlaw.org. 
 5. For an informative discussion about the definition of laïcité, see EMILE POULAT, 
NOTRE LAÏCITÉ PUBLIQUE [OUR PUBLIC LAÏCITÉ] 155–56 (2003) (“There is no firm 
definition of laïcité: neither officially established nor generally accepted.”) (translated by T. 
Jeremy Gunn). The Le Grand Robert Dictionary gives the following definition of laïcité: 
“Political notion involving the separation of civil society and religious society, the State 
exercising no religious power and the churches exercising no political power.” PAUL ROBERT, 
LE GRAND ROBERT DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE (1992) (translated by T. Jeremy Gunn).  
 6. Laïcité first appears as a constitutional term in Article I of the French Constitution 
of 1946. The text reads: “France is a Republic that is indivisible, laic, democratic, and social.” 
1946 CONST. art. I (Fr.) (translated by T. Jeremy Gunn). The 1958 Constitution uses exactly 
the same language. See 1958 CONST. art. II (Fr.). 
7. Jaques Chirac, Address at the Elysée Palace (Dec. 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/francais/interventions/discours_et_declarations/2003/ 
decembre/discours_prononce_par_m_jacques_chirac_president_de_la_republique_relatif_au_ 
respect_du_principe_de_laicite_dans_la_republique-palais_de_l_elysee.2829.html. 
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idea to instinctively oppose one’s right to manifest religious 
conviction in the public sphere. It is often said by Frenchmen that 
laïcité allows religion only in the private sphere. 
This insight into France’s tendency to confuse the State’s 
neutrality with containment of religious expression in the public 
sphere nicely introduces my topic for today’s address. The degree of 
toleration of religious expression manifested in the public sphere is 
related to the historical perception of what the public sphere means. 
In the case of France, the notion of public sphere explains why, in 
many ways, the self understanding of the manifestation of public 
neutrality is more important than the manifestation of collective or 
individual religious expression.  
For this reason, I first discuss in Part I the differences between 
how Europe, especially France, and the United States define the 
public sphere. I then describe the place of religion in the public 
sphere in Europe—focusing primarily on France—and in the United 
States. In Part II, I contend that both countries’ perceptions of the 
place of religion in the public sphere are endangering freedom of 
religion. For instance, an unacknowledged but healthy civil religion 
in the United States limits religious freedom in the public sphere just 
as surely as strict adherence to laïcité limits religious freedom in 
France.8 In Part III, I offer insights into how both Europe and the 
United States should adapt some of their practices to guarantee 
freedom of religion more fully. Finally, Part IV offers a brief 
conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. What Is the Public Sphere? 
To address the place of religion in the public sphere requires us, 
above all, to define what we mean by the phrase “public sphere.” 
Unfortunately, there is no legal definition of public sphere in any of 
our democratic constitutions.9 The public sphere is a rather broad 
and vague concept that political and juridical theorists use in order to 
 8. See JEREMY GUNN & BLANDINE CHELINI-PONT, DIEU EN FRANCE ET AUX ETATS-
UNIS, QUAND LES MYTHES FONT LA LOI [GOD IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES: WHEN 
MYTHS MAKE LAW] (2005).  
 9. See CHARLES JONES, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY 
(1970).  
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reflect upon and to build a common societal organization.10 
However, this concept does not convey the same meaning on both 
sides of the Atlantic. For convenience, I will limit my comparison to 
the different understandings of the public sphere in Europe, focusing 
primarily on France, and in the United States. 
The definitions of the public sphere in the United States and in 
Europe are similar at first glance: the public sphere is the organized 
and concretized common space of a given population. It is clearly 
separate from private space (also well organized and concretized), 
which allows individuals and families to live their religions privately. 
However, this perception of the common space is not exactly the 
same in Europe and in the United States, since both political entities 
have very different perceptions of religion and its proper place in 
society. 
 In the United States, two interconnected theories of the public 
sphere are particularly relevant. In the liberal tradition of democratic 
theorists, ranging from Alexis de Tocqueville11 to Harvard doctoral 
student Evan Charney,12 the public sphere has been viewed as the 
space common for all, where citizens can freely discuss and deliberate 
ideas, commit themselves to voluntary associative forms, and 
improve and control the various levels of their common life. The 
second theory, espoused by more recent theorists like Hannah 
Arendt,13 Robert D. Putnam,14 Jürgen Habermas,15 and Seyla 
Benhabib,16 locates the public sphere not so much in the legal and 
material organization of this space, as did the Greek polis, but in civil 
society itself, moved by a continuing deliberative and critical 
 10. See H. JENKINS-SMITH & PAUL SABATIER, THEORIES OF POLICY PROCESS (1999). 
 11. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans., 
Schocken 1961) (1835). 
 12. See Evan Charney, Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public 
Sphere, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 97 (1998).  
 13. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (Doubleday & Anchor 1959) 
(1958). 
 14. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J. 
DEMOCRACY 65 (1995). 
 15. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 329 (William Rehg trans., 
1996) (1992).  
 16. See Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in 
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 67 (Seyla 
Benhabib ed., 1996); SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND 
POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 120 (1992). 
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process.17 While such theories may resonate among the American 
citizenry, to Europeans these thoughts reflect on a very high, 
conceptual level the deeply liberal conscience of American society, 
whose citizens think of themselves naturally as actors in the common 
space.18  
 Although Europeans are also very sensitive to the deliberative 
and associative democratic process and diligently strive to 
cooperatively manage their common space, their conception of the 
public sphere does not readily accept these theories. Why? Because 
Europeans understand the State as the first intermediary between 
society and citizens—the State is responsible for legal and practical 
civil society.19 This sensibility is inherited from continental history 
that painfully gave up feudalism and rediscovered the superiority of 
Greek political thought and Roman practical organization over the 
benefit of the monarchic power. In viewing the State as the first 
intermediary between society and citizens, Europeans immediately 
associate the rules and functions of the State with the word “State.” 
The true public sphere in France, for example, is the space where the 
State exerts its authority for the benefit of all and at the service of all. 
The concept of the public sphere in Europe relies on the old notion 
of the common good, originally understood to include the 
responsibility of accounting to God for one’s actions, but which now 
also includes accounting to the citizens of the state for the actions of 
the State. In this conception, the State is responsible for the public 
order (safety and health)—a concept with ramifications that justify all 
kinds of circumstantial and legal limitations in the public sphere.20
 17. Charney, supra note 12, at 97. 
 18. Wayne Gabardi, Contemporary Models of Democracy, 33 POLITY 547 (2001). 
 19. For a discussion about the French sense of the State, see Ellen Badone, Identity and 
Democracy, 20 FRENCH POL., CULTURE & SOC’Y, 121 (2002), which comments on the 
meaning of Marcel Gauchet’s essay LA RELIGION DANS LA DEMOCRATIE, PARCOURS DE LA 
LAICITE 129 (1998). This thought-provoking essay analyzes the changing relationships 
between the French state and the individual. The author contends that French republican 
democracy originally developed as a bulwark against the hegemony of the Roman Catholic 
Church. However, in the secularized context of present-day France, such protection is no 
longer necessary. Hence, democracy has lost much of its original meaning. In the past, political 
actors privileged the collective good above private interests and identités. Now, however, it is 
precisely these agendas that have come to dominate French political discourse. In the face of 
competing minority demands, government must remain neutral and can no longer serve as the 
moral arbiter for the collectivity. 
 20. The concept of public order is perhaps as important to France as laïcité. Article X of 
the 1789 Declaration on the Rights of Man limits the right to publicly express opinions, 
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B. Effects on the Role of Religion 
The different perceptions of the concept of public sphere in the 
United States and in Europe accordingly translate into different 
perceptions of the State’s place and role within that public sphere. 
There is a difference in the power given to the State by its citizens, 
and there is especially a difference in the State’s legitimate actions in 
service of its citizens. 
1. The role of religion in the European public sphere 
In the case of France, virtually all citizens consider the State to 
be the guardian responsible for everything that occurs outside of the 
private sphere,21 and this cultural fact is not about to change. 
Europeans cherish the State, its public institutions, and the services it 
provides, even if they often criticize its tax voracity, its unwieldy 
bureaucracy, and its inefficiency. With its distant inheritance from 
the Roman Empire, religion in Europe rises to the responsibility of 
the State.22 For a very long time, religion was used for the purpose of 
uniting disparate populations and areas and was thus the best way to 
build a public sphere. Religion was, more than anything else, an issue 
of law and order. Kings required the conformity of their subjects to 
including religious views, to those public manifestations that do not disturb the public order. 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN, art. X (Fr. 1789), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/rightsof.htm. France’s 1848 constitution also 
emphasizes public order, noting that public order is among those values that make up the base 
of the republic. 1848 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.) (translated by Holly Hinckley Lesan), available at 
http://www.laicite-republique.org/documents/textesfondateurs/textesfondateurspdf/1848 
%20France%20constitution.pdf. In recent years, the Conseil Constitutionnel has held that 
“preventing violations of public order, in particular violations of the safety of persons and 
property, [is] necessary for the implementation of constitutional principles and rights.” CC 
decision no. 80-127DC, Jan. 22, 1981, Rec. 15 (translated by Holly Hinckley Lesan), 
available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/1980/80127dc.htm. The 
concept of the public order figures heavily in France’s debate as to what belongs in the public 
sphere. 
 21. See Badone, supra note 19. 
 22. Constantine was the first emperor to use his authority to force the Christian bishops 
to adopt the same, unique formula of faith when he decided to organize the first Ecumenical 
Council of Nicaea in AD 325. See KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF GOD 110 (1993). With 
Theodosius in AD 381, Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire and the 
only religion of its citizens. Jews were thereafter persecuted. The Roman Emperor, originally 
pontifex, was charged with the duty of surveying and favoring the orthodoxy of his citizens. See 
id. at 106; Nigel Pollard, Roman Religion Gallery, BBC HOMEPAGE: HISTORY, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ancient/romans/roman_religion_gallery_09.shtml (last 
visited May 10, 2005).  
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the king’s religious precepts, whether Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, 
or Calvinist. This requirement is illustrated by the famous adage, 
Cujus regio ejus religio, Latin for “whose rule, his religion.”23
The legacy of these former times remains influential, as 
evidenced in two ways: first, by the frequent and legal occurrence of 
a specific relationship between the state and religion—with the state 
granting religious status and limiting the scope of a religion’s 
activities; and second, by the normative tendency to consider religion 
as a public, charitable, medical, educational, and even spiritual 
service. Consequently, it seems natural for the State to collaborate 
with religious leaders as much as possible in order to help citizens in 
need of such services. 
This background illustrates that the place for religion in the 
European public sphere is well delineated and ordered. The clarity of 
religion’s role in the public sphere means that new or minority 
religions benefit from the state-religion dynamic only after they make 
necessary legal claims. For example, although the French State 
organizes worship in places that it is responsible for administering, 
such as chaplaincies, prisons, hospitals, the military, and public 
schools, the State organizes only for the three oldest religions: 
Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism.24 The Islamic religion has 
had some difficulties penetrating these institutions (except prisons 
and sometimes hospitals), and other movements are frankly kept 
away by the very strict and complex process of authorization. 
Additionally, minority religions either do not know about or have 
difficulties obtaining legal privileges that are given to mainstream 
religions.25
 23. See, e.g., DAVID OGG, EUROPE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 36 (Adam & 
Charles Black 1971) (1925). The phrase means that “a ruler has the right to determine the 
religion of his territory.” NEW CATHOLIC DICTIONARY (1910), available at 
http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/ncd02512.htm. 
 24. See Francis Messner, L’aumômerie des services publics [Chaplaincy in Public Services], 
in TRAITÉ DE DROIT FRANÇAIS DES RELIGIONS [TREATISE ON FRENCH LAW CONCERNING 
RELIGION] 455–62 (Litec ed., 2003) [hereinafter TREATISE ON FRENCH LAW]. 
 25. If the religious association is organized under the legal framework of worship 
association (Law of December 9, 1905), the French administration has to verify the strict 
conformity of the associative activity with the legal terms of the Law about “worship activity” 
and can refuse the previous exemptions. If the religious association is organized under the 
auspices of the common association (Law on Associations, 1901), then the French 
administration can give it the status of public utility (Décret of Aug. 16, 1901, J.O. Aug. 17, 
1901), which exempts the association from taxes on benefit and land. The French 
administration can confer this status only after the association asks for it and presents reliable 
BLANDINE.PP1 9/13/2005 3:09 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
618 
 
To reach the public sphere and to profit fully from freedom of 
public worship in France, a religion must appear to have the 
characteristics of an established religion with which society is already 
familiar. For example, traditional Catholic processions in French 
cities do not need to be declared to the Mayor, but plans for other 
religious processions or public meetings must be submitted in 
advance in an official declaration to the Town Hall.26 To distribute 
religious literature was, until December 2004, strictly limited by a 
law regulating hocking.27 Public preaching or leafletting is otherwise 
prohibited in many places considered public ways.28 The implicit 
tendency of the French State is to define first whether its religious 
partner is religious and only then to accept its entry into the public 
sphere if its actions are deemed useful. The numerical size of the 
religion is very valuable in this perception. 29
documents. As a result of the Law of July 23, 1987, French associations can receive money 
from individuals and companies, but if they are worship associations, then they need 
administrative authorization. The French revenue administration is the only agency that 
determines whether an association meets the “general interest” test, which would exempt it 
from paying taxes on money received. Catholic associations are traditionally well treated by the 
French administration. For instance, the diocesan associations, as well as the other Catholic 
associations (especially the charitable ones), are always tax-exempt and left in peace with their 
incomes and properties. See Francis Messner, Droit fiscal et patrimonial [Tax and Inheritance 
Law], in TREATISE ON FRENCH LAW, supra note 24, at 855–94; Alain Garay, Les régimes 
fiscaux et leur influence sur les politiques religieuses [Tax Systems and Their Influence on 
Religious Policy], in QUELLE POLITIQUE RELIGIEUSE EN EUROPE ET EN MÉDITERRANÉE 
[WHAT RELIGIOUS POLICY IN EUROPE AND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN] 45–67 (PUAM 2004) 
[hereinafter WHAT RELIGIOUS POLICY].  
 26. Law of Oct. 23, 1935, Dalloz Législation [D.L.], périodique 1935, Part IV p. 367 
(indicating that some religions “are under an obligation of a preliminary declaration for any 
procession, parade, or assembly of any person and in a general way any manifestation in the 
public way” (translation by Holly Hinckley Lesan and Richard Call)).  
 27. Law of July 29, 1881 on freedom of the press, Chapter III, art. 18–22 (“Posting, 
Hawking and Selling in the Public Way” (translation by Holly Hinckley Lesan and Richard 
Call)). The text was extended by a decision of the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de 
Cassation, January 26, 1950, to the religious literature and regulated the religious hocking 
until its abrogation by Law No. 2004-1343 of Dec. 9, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 10, 2004, article 131. 
 28. Emmanuel Tawil, La police administrative des cultes en droit français [The 
Administrative Police of Religious Sects in French Law], in REVUE DE LA RECHERCHE 
JURIDIQUE, DROIT PROSPECTIF [REVIEW OF JURIDICAL RESEARCH, PROSPECTIVE LAW] III 
508–09 (2004). 
 29. For a discussion of the distinctions between religious entities based on size, see 
generally T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States 
and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419. Religious associations may be either registered or 
unregistered and are classified based on various criterion, one of which is size. 
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Paradoxically, because of the historical relationship between the 
state and religion, and the subsequent reaction against it, separation 
between church and state was reached. In Europe, separation 
between church and state connotes the State’s regulation of the 
public sphere and religious freedom in the private sphere. 
Consequently, this separation has resulted in the fading of religion 
from the European public sphere. Separation between church and 
state was established in Europe for the benefit of the confessional 
neutrality of the State vis-à-vis religion, which neutrality in theory 
works to guarantee freedoms for citizens and to ensure a 
governmental system based on liberal, universal, and reasonable 
values, rather than religious values.  
This concept of separation, however, has surely led to a more 
visible secularization of the public sphere, where the State now has a 
monopoly. To some extent, the secularization of the State—that was 
gradually or abruptly reached, depending on the nation’s history—
allowed the citizens to exert their freedom of conscience and to 
avoid membership in a single or state-authorized religion. However, 
this secularization led to the visible disappearance of religion from 
the public sphere. For example, in France, the Conseil d’Etat 
established in September 1972 that the State’s neutrality principle 
unequivocally required that its public officers not wear any 
manifestation of religious adherence while performing their public 
functions.30
The departure from the fused relationship between religion and 
the State in Europe led not only to a secularization of the public 
space but also to a privatization of religion. While France appears to 
be a country where religion is excluded from the public sphere, this 
perception is false in many real and juridical ways;31 however, as a 
 30. Avis of September 21, 1972 about the neutrality of the public officers. See also Avis 
Dlle Marteaux of May 3, 2000, Journal Officiel de la République Français [J.O] [Official 
Gazette of France], June 23, 2000, available at http://www.legifrance.org and 
http://www.religlaw.org. For other references, see Réflexions sur la Laïcité, rapport 2004 du 
Conseil d’Etat, La Documentation Française, Paris, 2004, available at 
http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/044000121/0001.pdf; Francis Messner, 
La neutralité des fonctionnaires dans le service, La neutralité religieuse de l’Etat [The Neutrality 
of Civil Servants], in TREATISE ON FRENCH LAW, supra note 24, at 430–32. 
 31. Free and public worship activity in places of worship is protected by the Laws of 
January 2, 1907 and March 28, 1907. Places of worship are free from a legal declaration. See 
Francis Messner, Les manifestations extérieures des cultes [Exterior Manifestations of Sects], in 
TREATISE ON FRENCH LAW, supra note 24, at 518–27. 
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practical matter, it is often true that religion is indeed excluded from 
the public sphere. The fear that religion might once again take on a 
public role, however painfully reduced this role may be, drives 
officials and politicians to consider new movements like Islam as a 
threat to the now-secularized public sphere. The general French 
population fears harm to the neutrality of the public sphere from 
religious activities such as public proselyting (particularly favored by 
African Pentecostals) or the wearing of the Islamic veil in public 
schools. The populace believes that the public sphere should be a 
neutral space, free from authoritarian religious influence. The 
separation of church and state is instinctively considered to be a 
salutary survey of religion in the public sphere because of both the 
State’s neutrality and the freedom of conscience of the citizens. The 
French law of March 2004,32 in response to the Muslim veil 
controversy, is an archetypal example of this cultural perception of 
the public sphere. 
2. The role of religion in the United States’ public sphere 
In comparison, U.S. citizens do not consider the State to be a 
supervisor that must oversee religion or drive it out of the public 
sphere to avoid possible manipulation. To the contrary, the State is 
seen as guaranteeing most scrupulously all forms of religious 
manifestation. For example, American public opinion was strongly 
against the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith,33 in which the Court upheld the denial of unemployment 
benefits to two Native Americans who were fired for misbehavior 
because they used peyote as part of their religious practice.34 The 
American populace seemed to feel that this decision permitted undue 
limitations on an individual’s right to freely practice her religion. It is 
 32. See supra note 5.  
 33. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See also DANIEL A. BROWN, CHURCH-STATE ISSUES IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1989–1991; Quaderni di Diritto E Politica Exxlesiastica, 1991–1992/2, 
CEDAM, 166–90. 
 34. See BROWN, supra note 33, at 182. He states, 
There followed an immediate flurry of activity on the part of many 
churches and civil rights organisations to have the case reviewed. 
Editorials of major law school reviews, Native American publications and 
church organisations have roundly opposed the Supreme Court’s action 
as an abridgement of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.  
Id. 
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very clear for a European—as it is for the United States Supreme 
Court—that the legislature should limit religious activity that is also 
illegal behavior, such as polygamy,35 or in this instance, narcotic 
use.36  
Nevertheless, many Americans and numerous associations 
disagreed with the Smith decision. The United States Congress 
responded to Smith by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, which prohibits the government from substantially burdening 
an individual’s free exercise of religion even if the burden is one of 
general applicability.37 Only in circumstances where the burden “(1) 
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest” can the government pass and enforce a law 
that prohibits an individual from practicing certain tenets of her 
religion.38 The Court responded by ruling the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act unconstitutional as applied to state governments,39 
once again demonstrating that there are some limitations on the 
United States Constitution’s protection of the right to freely practice 
one’s religion. 
 U.S. citizens consider religion in the United States to be 
foremost a personal freedom. The public sphere is seen as a place 
where individuals exercise multiple personal freedoms in their 
capacity as religious citizens, politicians, legislators, or as members of 
religious groups or institutions. For Europeans, it is surprising that a 
President, elected by a majority of citizens, could call publicly for the 
blessing of God,40 or justify his actions with his faith. In the United 
 35. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 36. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.  
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court held that requiring 
states to meet the compelling interest test overstepped Congress’ duty not to infringe on state 
sovereignty and therefore contradicted “vital principles necessary to maintain separation of 
powers and the federal balance.” Id. at 536. However, “[e]very appellate court that has 
squarely addressed the question has held that the [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] governs 
the activities of federal officers and agencies.” O’Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 
401 (7th Cir. 2003).  
 40. At his first inaugural address, President George W. Bush, a born-again Methodist, 
“referred to God in vague[] terms as a ‘higher power’ and ‘author’; used such words as 
‘democratic faith’; and referred to a saying by Mother Teresa and the parable of the good 
Samaritan to bolster his doctrine of ‘compassionate conservatism.’” Julia Duin, Faithful Bush 
Calls on God’s Blessings, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, available at 
BLANDINE.PP1 9/13/2005 3:09 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
622 
 
States, religion is often present in political debates and in legislative 
ceremony.41 Religions enjoy a long associative tradition, a liberal tax 
policy,42 ample freedom of worship, and open expression in the 
public sphere. 
In American history, the principle of free exercise of religion 
ultimately undermined the former legal prohibitions that several 
states had imposed against Catholics, Adventists, Mormons, and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.43 The Civil Rights Act of 1964,44 the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,45 and related Supreme Court 
cases46 show that the United States goes extremely far to protect 
freedom of conscience and collective and public religious expression. 
III. A COMMITMENT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR BOTH EUROPE 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
Given this overview, the following question arises: in light of 
such important differences in the public manifestation of religion 
between Europe and the United States, does the commitment to 
defend religious freedom concern only Europe? In other words, does 
Europe need to question its commitment to the requirements of 
religious freedom while the United States leads the way? I propose 
that a real commitment to religious freedom would correct not only 
the failures of European systems but also the less obvious failures of 
http://washingtontimes.com/national/20050121-122814-5978r.htm. At the outset of his 
second inaugural address, President Bush said, “every man and woman on this earth has rights, 
and dignity, and matchless value, because they bear the image of the Maker of heaven and 
earth.” Later, while challenging the world’s dictators, he quoted Abraham Lincoln: “Those 
who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves; and, under the rule of a just God, 
cannot long retain it.” Id. See also Press Release, The White House, President George W. 
Bush’s Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/inaugural-address.html; Press Release, The White House, President Sworn-In to Second 
Term (Jan. 20, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/ 
20050120-1.html. 
 41. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding Nebraska’s 
legislative prayer despite a First Amendment challenge). 
 42. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 170(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)-(d), 
1.170A-9(a) (2000). 
 43. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002); WILLIAM R. 
HUTCHISON, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN AMERICA: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF A 
FOUNDING IDEAL (2003); JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 100 (2000). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
 45. Id. § 2000bb-1. 
 46.  See, e.g., W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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the American system. Although it is easier to note and to criticize 
Europe’s sometimes excessive protection of the public sphere from 
religion, similar failings exist in the American system of religious 
freedom. In truth, lessons can be learned from the failures and 
successes of both systems. 
A. Europe 
The European system often regards religion in the public sphere 
as an interference and a form of competition necessary to control and 
contain. This explains European choices to discriminate between 
known and lesser-known religions concerning their respective 
relations with the State.47 When public expression of religion is 
organized in a specific manner by the State, things may appear to be 
normalized; the State retains some control of what expression is and 
is not acceptable. The State fixes the rules of religious expression in a 
space (the public sphere) that it controls and that is very large. The 
State is neutral from a denominational point of view, but religions 
must pass through its formal or abstract recognition process (like the 
French Council of Muslim Worship)48 in order to be accepted in the 
public sphere. 
Thus, although the mechanisms are in place to foster genuine 
religious freedom, it takes a religious organization’s time and hard 
work to enjoy the concrete implications of religious freedom. Liberty 
in the public sphere is currently theoretically recognized for all 
religions, and nation-states in Europe are likely to slowly lose their 
old, strict supervisory status. The examples of Italy and Spain49 are 
illustrative because both states had been historically denominational, 
 47. See RELIGIONS ET LAÏCITÉ EN EUROPE [RELIGIONS AND LAÏCITÉ IN EUROPE] (Jean 
Baubérot ed., 1994).  
 48. Frank Frégosi, le culte musulman et la République, la régulation publique de l’islam 
dans un cadre laïque [Muslim Worship and the Republic: The Public Regulation of Islam in the 
Secular Scope], in L’ISLAM EN FRANCE ET EN ALLEMAGNE: IDENTITES ET CITOYENNETES 
[ISLAM IN FRANCE AND IN GERMANY: IDENTITIES AND CITIZENSHIPS] 63–71 (Rémy Leveau 
et al. eds., 2001).  
 49. Joaquim Mantecon, Relations Etat-Religion et liberté religieuse en Espagne [Church-
State Relations and Religious Liberty in Spain], in WHAT RELIGIOUS POLICY, supra note 25, at 
72–78; Francis Messner, Le Statut des Confessions Religieuses dans les Pays du Sud de l’Europe 
[The Status of Religious Confessiosn in the Countries of Southern Europe], in ETATS, RELIGIONS 
ET LIBERTÉ RELIGIEUSE EN MÉDITERRANÉE [STATES, RELIGIONS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN 
THE MEDITERRANEAN] 137–47 (PUAM 2002) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE 
MEDITERRANEAN]. The Spanish legal texts on religious regulation are available at http:// 
www.mju.es/asuntos_religiosos/menu_ne.htlm. 
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had entered into concordats with the Vatican, and had recognized 
public religious demonstrations by only the Catholic Church.50 
Recently, however, they have undergone evolutions modifying how 
they deal with religious freedom. 
B. United States 
Religious freedom as a principle is also in need of defending in 
the United States, although many Americans do not seem to 
recognize it. With unique frequency, the State as a political and 
administrative organization is subjected to pressure by religious 
lobbies “to save or support religion” in the public sphere. To analyze 
the danger of this reality, I turn to John Rawls’ definition of political 
liberalism.51 If a liberal democracy regards its public sphere as a 
renewable field of its own possibilities, it should not forget that 
democracy is weakened when the public sphere is not adequately 
protected from civil society harassment—in this case, harassment 
from religious groups that are advancing their private religious 
agendas. Rawls points out that the public sphere is more than a 
broad choice of competitive opinions that fight to influence legal 
institutions and state services.52 If the State is transformed into the 
servant of the best-defended or best-financed opinions, then it ends 
up abdicating its irreducible duty to represent all the interests of all 
its citizens53 because the inequalities of greater private wealth permit 
certain individuals or groups greater influence.54 In time, it is likely 
that the inequalities of influence will lead to certain individuals 
having a preponderant weight of authority.55
There is an inherent danger in treating the public sphere as a 
sphere to be sold to the best-financed religious cause rather than as a 
common space where public institutions are available for all. Such 
treatment of the public sphere implies that some religious groups 
wish to divert the democratic system for their own private interests. 
 50. Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, Organisation cultuelle, du XIXème siècle à la 
décolonisation en Europe du Sud [Religious Organization, from the Nineteenth Century to the 
Decolonization of Southern Europe], in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, supra 
note 49, at 15–40. 
 51. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 43–44 (Columbia Univ. Press 1993). 
 52. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 225 (Belknap Press 1971). 
 53. See THE PUBLIC INTEREST 14-26 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., Atherton Press 1962).  
 54. Id. at 1–14.  
 55. Id.  
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Religion should never have the opportunity to control public offices, 
notably the highest offices, or directly influence public debates and 
changes in the laws. To allow religions such power adversely affects 
the practice of democracy, which in turn threatens the very survival 
of religious freedom. A few examples will illustrate this point. 
Prohibiting abortion because God forbids it in the holy texts of 
Christians, Jews, or Muslims is not a legitimate reason in a liberal 
democracy to prohibit abortion—although it could be a very 
legitimate question, of public debate, about the degree of respect for 
human life in free societies. It is additionally a serious deviance from 
liberal democracy for citizens or religious groups to demand direct 
government grants for their churches on the basis of their belief in 
their individual freedom and in their church’s ability to deal with 
social problems. President Bush’s faith-based initiatives project, 
which allows religious charities to compete equally for government 
grants without sacrificing their spiritual character,56 demonstrates 
that many people in America fail to appreciate the important 
difference between their private actions and the appropriate aims of 
the public sphere. The State’s policy is founded on the fundamental 
principle that any citizen should have the right, as a member of the 
national community, to minimal education, health, and security.57 
That some believers commit to mobilize themselves by compassion 
and moral duty to relieve others of misery is a question of personal 
engagement in which the State need not get directly involved. The 
public wealth distribution resulting from taxes is not the business of 
charity or faith, but the realm of law within constitutional limits.58 
Forgetting, in the name of the primacy of personal freedom, the 
difference between the public sphere and private interests threatens 
 56. See generally Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Can an Office Change a Country? The White 
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, A Year in Review, THE PEW FORUM 
ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, available at http://pewforum.org/events/022002/ 
tenpas.pdf. 
 57. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the 
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America. 
Id. 
 58. Dana Milbank, Bush Legislative Approach Failed in Faith Bill Battle; White House is 
Faulted for Not Building a Consensus in Congress, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2003, at A1. 
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democracy itself. To point out the difference between the public and 
private spheres and to defend that difference in the name of religious 
freedom preserves the democratic spirit, which in turn preserves 
religious freedom. 
The public sphere, according to Rawls, should be at the service 
of the people.59 The State should not put itself in charge of the 
interests of religious groups, even when they are joined together in 
powerful associations. From this point of view, rejecting a state-
endorsed religion, the famous “wall of separation” about which 
Jefferson60 and others61 spoke, prevents religion from imposing itself 
on others and also protects American institutions from religious 
imposition. A true wall of separation would protect American 
citizens from being constrained contrary to their freedom of 
conscience and expression. The defense of religious freedom should 
be used in the United States to remind people that the wall of 
separation between the State and religion is a prerequisite to many 
principles, including freedom of individual conscience and 
expression, equal treatment of all religions in their personal and 
collective expression, denominational neutrality of public 
institutions, and finally, educational freedom and freedom to 
proselytize. 
In order to fully realize religious freedom, which joins together 
so many fundamental values, it is necessary that the State favor no 
single religion. Petitioning for the return of religion to public 
schools, for example, is like asking the State to restrict religious 
freedom by imposing its own religious vision or allowing specific 
groups to impose their views on others in public schools. Religious 
freedom will be much more secure if children are taught the values 
of democracy in conformity with the sense of a public sphere. 
Similarly, the recent laws enacted to maintain the expression “under 
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance62 appear to an outsider as the 
 59. RAWLS, supra note 52, at 9. 
 60. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut 
(Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.usconstitution.net/jeffwall.html. 
 61. Sometime after 1817, President James Madison wrote an essay entitled Monopolies, 
which also refers to the importance of church-state separation. He stated in part, “Strongly 
guarded as is the separation between religion and Government in the Constitution of the 
United States the danger of encroachment by Ecclesiastical Bodies, may be illustrated by 
precedents already furnished in their short history.” James Madison, Monopolies (n.d.), 
available at http://worldpolicy.org/globalrights/religion/madison-detachedmem.html.  
 62. The Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. § 4 (1998), upheld in Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
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defense of a civil religion, as obligatory as the French laïcité, when 
this constitutional principle is called upon by politicians to prohibit 
religious behavior at public school. In both cases, freedom of 
conscience is not seriously considered. The oath, “under God,” does 
not prove that the State respects freedom of religion or its own 
neutrality, because its political representatives voted for an obviously 
Christian phrase.  
Whereas in the United States, religious activists pursuing their 
private religious objectives overwhelm the public sphere, it is also 
recognizable that sometimes the public sphere in Europe restricts 
religions unfairly in their public manifestations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Religious neutrality of the State is the best guarantee for 
religious freedom of its citizens, especially when they are not 
Christians or when they don’t adhere to any religion. With thirty 
million immigrants in its population in 2000,63 the future of the 
United States and its society would be enhanced if its public 
institutions and the State would release themselves from this actual 
civil religion, openly Christian and providential, because of the very 
religious freedom that the First Amendment professes. In the same 
way, France should reduce its civil religion of laïcité if it wants to 
respect its constitutional principle of neutrality, which demands 
respect for all beliefs and freedom of religion, even in their collective 
manifestations. 
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). 
 63. Estimates of the numbers of immigrants in the United States range from 28.4 to 
31.1 million, based on varying interpretations of census data collected in the year 2000. (The 
total U.S. population in 2000 was 281 million.) See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS (2004), 
available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2003/2003Yearbook.pdf. 
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